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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS
TAKINGS CLAUSE
INTERPRETATION: THE TRADITION
OF INCONSISTENCY CONTINUES
The takings clause of the fifth amendment protects private
property owners in the event of confiscation of their property by
the federal government by mandating that just compensation be
paid.' This constitutional requirement has been consistently de-
fined as a mere limitation on the historically embedded right of a
sovereign to exercise its power of eminent domain.2 Originally,
I U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o per-
son shall .. .be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id. The fifth amend-
ment is a "tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private property for public use"
which obliges the federal government to pay just compensation for property thus taken.
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946). See J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE
FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1, at 1-2 (1982) (fifth amendment distributes loss
among taxpayers rather than the deprived party). The fourteenth amendment applies the
just compensation rule to individual states by providing that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. Every state has a takings clause within its constitution with the exception of New
Hampshire and North Carolina, which have common law equivalents. See Note, Inverse
Condemnation and the Alchemist's Lesson: You Can't Turn Regulations Into Gold, 21 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 171, 171 n.l (1981) (listing of state constitutional takings clauses).
' R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE PowER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 35 (1985).
The taking of private property has been prohibited since ancient times. Id. The power of
eminent domain was exercised by the government of ancient Rome, although the term
"eminent domain" did not come into use until after the Middle Ages. I NICHOLs, THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.12[l], at 1-13 (1. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1985). The writings of
Grotius, Puffendorf, Domat, and Montesquieu discussed the sovereign's right to appropri-
ate private property in the interest of the public good, but. they did not agree that compen-
sation of the original owner was required in all situations. Id. § 1.2[21, at 1-66. See Rice,
Eminent Domain From Grotius to Gettysburg, 53 A.B.A. J. 1039 (1967), reprinted in VALUATION
FOR EMINENT DOMAIN 353, 353 (E. Rams ed. 1973) (Grotius recognized property as being a
manifestation of man's will, and stated that it was "wicked" to take property away from a
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the government's obligation to pay just compensation was inter-
preted as applying only to the actual appropriation of property.3
Through subsequent interpretation, the "takings clause" has
evolved to require just compensation for infringements on prop-
erty which amount to far less than actual confiscation."
It has long been accepted that an individual's private property
rights, while safeguarded by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, may be limited by the lawful exercise of state police power
for the advancement of the public health, safety, morals or the
general welfare.5 Property regulations and restrictions imposed
person against his will). The Magna Carta required just compensation for governmental
takings by providing that "no constable or any other of our bailiffs shall take any man's
corn or other chattels unless he pays cash for them at once or can delay payment with the
agreement of the seller." MAGNA CARTA, cap. 28.
The protection of private property rights has been viewed as a "vital principle of repub-
lican institutions," and equivalent to the protection of personal liberty. Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-36 (1897). The "integral" rights associ-
ated with the ownership of property are as follows: "(1) Right of occupation; (2) Right of
excluding others; (3) Right of disposition ... ; (4) Right of transmission . 2 NICHOLS,
supra, § 5.01[1], at 5-9 (quoting 3 BENTHAM'S WORKS 182 (1843 ed.)).
8 See infra notes 15-20 (discussion of physical invasion theory). See also Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101, 113-14 (Pa. 1843) (property owner whose
property was flooded was not entitled to compensation); Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of
Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 222-28 (1931) (early concepts of property required that
only actual appropriation constituted takings); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain: Policy
and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596, 599 (1954) (takings only found upon confiscation of
property).
" See 11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.26 (rev. 3d ed. 1983).
"Formerly a taking was limited to actual physical appropriation of the property or a divest-
ing of title, but at present the rule ... is that when a person is deprived of any recognized
right in and appurtenant to tangible things .... his property is taken ...." Id. See generally
B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PART II: THE
RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 234-37 (1965).
* See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934). In Nebbia, the Supreme Court
noted that "neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute .... Equally funda-
mental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest."
Id. (citation omitted). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1904) (fourteenth
amendment was not designed to interfere with the reasonable conditions on property and
liberty imposed by police power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("[a ll prop-
erty in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not
be injurious to the community"); 6 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 24.10 ("private inter-
ests must be subservient to the general interest of the community").
It is said that the historical basis of the police power is founded upon the Latin maxim
salus populi suprema est lux (so use your property as not to injure the rights of another) and
was relied upon by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 62 (1872). While there are differences of opinion as to the definition, extent and
boundaries of the police power, "there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the
protection of the lives, health, and property of the citizens and the preservation of good
order and the public morals." Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877).
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under the auspices of the police power are presumed constitution-
ally valid," provided such provisions are neither arbitrary nor un-
reasonable7 and bear a rational relationship to the government's
State police power refers to the legislative powers of the states derived from the tenth
amendment which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 107 (although police power
is not expressly part of the Constitution, it refers to states' right to delegate power to cities
and counties); R. ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER: A STUDY IN
FEDERALISM 10 (1962) (police power is state's general power of legislation).
The police power is an expansive concept which is co-extensive with social necessity and
molded by modern exigencies. See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911)
(police power "may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the
prevailing morality or strong preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately neces-
sary to the public welfare"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1904) (Supreme Court
has recognized and upheld broad use of police power and has been "guided by the rules of
a very liberal nature"); Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1895) (police power may
act with reference to established usages, customs and traditions of the people to promote
their comfort), over'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 701 (1896) (legislative control may be exerted under police power
to that which is "contrary to public policy or inimical to the public interests"). See also 6 E.
MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at 443-44 (police power is flexible and must meet the changing
and shifting conditions which arise through increased population and the "complex com-
mercial and social relations of the people"); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, it 43 ("[Wlhat was
a century ago regarded as an improper exercise of the police power may now.., be recog-
nized as legitimate"); I E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE § 3-2, at 32-33 (1978) (police
power must be elastic and change and shift with society). One commentator has character-
ized.the police power as a "growth industry" in America today as a result of government's
expansive role in an increasingly complex society. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due
Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062 (1980).
While broad in nature, the police power is not unlimited in scope. See R. EPSTEzIN, supra
note 2, at 109. "The police power cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted grant of state
power to act in the public interest, for then the exception will overwhelm the clause." Id.
The police power necessarily has its limits and "must stop when it encounters the prohibi-
tions of the Constitution." Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912).
1 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (zoning ordinances are facially
constitutional); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (state's exercise of
its police power entitled to presumption of validity when challenged under due process and
commerce clauses); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (laws
and regulations which find their justification in some aspect of police power asserted for
public welfare presumed constitutional); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (every
presumption which favors validity of a statute must be indulged). See also 1 E. YOKLEY,
supra note 5, § 3-23, at 153 (zoning ordinances presumed valid).
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (constitu-
tionality of zoning regulations should be presumed until it is shown that "the provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable"); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Illinois ex rel.
Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 593 (1906) (validity of a regulation depends, in part,
upon whether its character is "arbitrary, or unreasonable beyond the necessities of the
case"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (exercise may not be an unreasona-
ble, unnecessary, or arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal
property or liberty). See also 6 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 24.09, at 435 (due process
clauses of federal and state constitutions "delimiting the exercise of the police power, pro-
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purpose of promoting legitimate state interests. 8 Although the ef-
fect of a given statute or regulation may impair the value of an
individual's property or even curtail its permissible use, the lawful
exercise of the police power is not compensable.' In some cases,
however, the Supreme Court has held that a regulation promul-
gated under the guise of a state's police power was unlawful and
required just compensation.1
hibit only an arbitrary, unreasonable, and improper use of such power").
I See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (since
regulations imposed by Landmark Commission were substantially related to promotion of
general welfare, there was no taking); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928) (restriction imposed on private property must bear "substantial relation" to public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 394-95 (1926) (zoning ordinance which restricted property to residential use was con-
stitutional because it was rationally related to municipality's purpose of promoting health
and safety). See also Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and The Supreme Court, 40
HARV. L. REv. 943, 1052 (1927) (courts have tested the legitimacy of a given statute by
examining the real and substantial relation between the statute and the objects of that
power); Stoebuck, supra note 5, at 1057-58 (government powers are limited in that govern-
ment may only perform acts that advance public interest).
I Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561,
593 (1906). Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated that "[c]ompensation has never
been a condition of [the police power's] exercise, even when attended with inconvenience
or peculiar loss, as each member of a community is presumed to be benefitted by that
which promotes the general welfare." Id. The legislature is empowered to make police
regulations which interfere with the full enjoyment of private property without compensa-
tion. Id. at 594. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (lawful state regulation
may be enforced without compensation for diminution in value resulting from a prohibi-
tory enactment). See also I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 83 (2d ed. 1968) (regu-
lations promulgated by police power are a "less expensive remedy" than the exercise of
eminent domain which requires compensation).
It is said that the state's power to regulate private property so as to attain the greatest
public good is justified under a "social contract" theory. See 6 E. MCQUILLtN, supra note 4,
at 443-44. The police power is incident to the social order and is an attribute of our society
that pre-dates and survives the Constitution. 1 E. YOKLEY, supra note 5, at 33. See also R.
ROESTINGER, supra note 5, at 15 (police power is a "system of internal regulation" which
seeks to preserve public order). The social contract or "utilitarian property theory" would
not require compensation in cases of social action aimed at redistribution of resources
which may result in diminution of reasonable investment-backed expectations. Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1213 (1967).
" See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980) (ordinance may not
extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 178 (1979) (government's attempt to create a public right of access interfered with
the landowner's "reasonable investment-backed expectations" and amounted to a taking):
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 593
(1905) (judiciary will invalidate legislation that substantially interferes with or injures the
protection of individual rights); 6 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at 437 (police power is "the
governmental competency to conserve, not impair, private rights). See also Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated
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The Supreme Court has recently decided three cases which
challenged local land use regulations as violative of the takings
clause. Two of the three cases, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictis" and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,"' dealt
with the issue of whether a taking had occurred. In the third, First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles/' the
Court did not address the issue of whether a county ordinance
worked a taking of a church's property, but instead determined
the time from which compensation should be calculated in the
event a taking is found to have occurred."'
This Article will discuss the law of takings by distinguishing
cases which involve the physical invasion of property from those
which concern the prohibition of disfavored uses of property.
With Keystone and Nollan being the most recent Supreme Court
cases to deal with these two aspects of the takings issue, this Arti-
cle will attempt to set forth the law of takings as it stands today.
Finally, the Supreme Court's holding in First English will be ana-
lyzed, and the current risks facing municipalities that wish to pass
zoning regulations will be discussed.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TAKINGS
A. Physical Invasion Theory
Early cases which have discussed the takings clause have found a
taking only where a physical invasion had occurred.15 This ap-
that if a regulation goes "too far" it will amount to a taking of private property and re-
quire compensation. Id. The determination of when a regulation reaches this threshold is a
"matter of degree." Id. at 416. Justice Holmes, referring to the case of Martin v. District of
Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 139 (1907), wrote "I took pleasure in pointing out that a man's
constitutional rights, the difference between the police power and the need of eminent
domain with compensation, might be a matter of feet and inches." JUSTICE HOLMES TO DR.
Wu, AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921-1932 17 (1949).
11 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
12 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
13 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
14 Id. at 2389.
is See, e.g., United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (flood caused by construction of
dam by the federal government was a taking); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166 (1871) (flood caused by dam built pursuant to state legislation constituted a
taking); See generally Note, Loretto v. Teleprompter: A Restatement of The Per Se Physical
Invasion Test for Takings, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 373, 373-75 (1983) (discussion of the cases
involving flooding caused by governmental action); Casenote, New Per Se Taking Rule Short
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proach to takings claims was adequate during the nineteenth cen-
tury, but became limited in the early 1900's due to the enactment
of land use zoning regulations.1 The case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co. 17 is an example of the Court's requirement of just compensa-
tion as a remedy for a physical invasion.
In Pumpelly, under authority of a state statute, a dam was built
on a lake adjacent to the plaintiff's property."' As a result of the
construction, the lake overflowed onto the plaintiff's property,
and he sought compensation.1 The Court dismissed the defend-
ant's argument that the property had not been appropriated, and
concluded that the physical invasion of the plaintiffs property
constituted a taking which required just compensation. 0
Circuits Cable Television Installations in New York. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corporation, 25 B.C.L. REV. 459, 463-66 (1984) (discussion of early physical inva-
sion cases).
" See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). "Building zone laws
are of modern origin. They began in this country about twenty-five years ago." Id. at 386.
Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, reasoned that the need for increased land use
and zoning restrictions was due to "the great increase and concentration of population..
." and the problems arising therefrom. Id. at 386-87. See also I P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS § 1.02[2], at 1-8 (1987) (discussion of the first attempts at comprehensive
zoning regulations).
"7 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
"8 Id. at 167. A Wisconsin statute had given the Green Bay Company the right to build a
dam across an outlet to Lake Winnebago which was adjacent to Pumpelly's property. Id.
"' Id. Six hundred and forty acres of Pumpelly's land had been either submerged or
permanently damaged by the flood. Id.
"0 Id. at 177-78. The Court reasoned that a construction of constitutional law which
would allow the government to permanently damage an individual's property without the
payment of just compensation would be unfair. Id. In the Court's opinion, any such ruling
would make the Constitution an "instrument of oppression rather than protection to indi-
vidual rights." Id. at 179. The Court maintained that "where real estate is actually invaded
by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artifi-
cial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking,
within the meaning of the Constitution .... " Id. at 181.
The physical invasion analysis utilized in Pumpelly was followed in subsequent flooding
cases. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1924) (no taking when
intermittent flooding of appellant's land was not directly linked to a canal constructed by
the government, and had not ousted the appellant nor prevented his customary use of the
land); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 474 (1903) (taking occurred when 420 acre
rice plantation was permanently flooded due to a dam built by the government on the
Savannah River). But see Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 218-20 (1904) (loss of
2,300 acres of land due to gradual change in the natural course of the Mississippi River
after government work to prevent erosion was merely an incidental consequence and not a
taking); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897) (interference with access to
property due to flood did not constitute a taking). Cf Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894). In Lawton, the appellant's nets had been confiscated pursuant to a New York statute
which prohibited fishing in Henderson Bay and Lake Ontario. Id. at 134-35. The Court
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More than a half century after Pumpelly was decided, the need
for air transportation created a new type of physical invasion. In
United States v. Causby," the respondent's property was in the
flight path of planes landing at a military airport.2 2 As a result of
the low altitude overflights, the respondent's property had be-
come commercially useless, and virtually uninhabitable.'s The
Court held that although the respondent did not make use of the
airspace above his home, the physical invasion of that space in
such a manner as to limit the owner's use and exploitation of his
property amounted to a taking.24 Through analogy, the Court
-held that a superadjacent use of property which did not touch the
land itself was a taking.'
A physical invasion may take the form of an actual invasion
,onto private property, low flights over the property, or even ac-
'held that since the value of the nets was only 15 dollars each, the destruction of property
,of such a "trifling value" in order to effectuate a valid statute did not require just compen-
sation. Id. at 141.
The Court has clarified the analysis of physical invasions in determining whether a tak-
ing has occurred by noting that the character of the invasion, rather than the amount of
damage resulting from it is the deciding factor. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328
(1917).
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Id. at 258. The property was approximately one-half mile from the runway of the
airport. Id. Military aircraft landing at the airport passed directly over the respondent's
property 83 feet above the ground. Id.
'3 Id. at 259. Causby, who operated a chicken farm on his property, claimed that due to
the noise of airplanes flying overhead and the glare of their lights at night, a large number
,of his chickens had been killed by flying into the walls in fright. Id. He further claimed that
the family had been deprived of sleep. Id.
Id. at 265. Although the overflights had not completely destroyed the respondent's
use and enjoyment of his property, the Court equated the flights over the property to an
elevated railway which had no structural supports on the property, but the tracks of which
were suspended above the property at the same altitude as the overflights. Id. at 264-65.
See Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 490-91 (1965) (there is a pro-
tected property right in airspace above land).
" See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1962) (low overflights approaching
airport which were within 30 feet of petitioner's residence constituted a taking); Ports-
mouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329 (1922) (repeated
,firing of artillery over appellant's land by a coastal artillery base could warrant a finding of
a taking); 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 6.21[21, at 6-138 to -139 (direct overflight super-
adjacent to property which directly affects the owner's enjoyment is an actual invasion); P.
ROHAN, supra note 21, § 1.05[2][h], at 1-93 to -95 (analysis of the validity of airport zon-
ing). But see Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1913) (firing of two shots
over appellant's property by a government military installation was not so intrusive as to
constitute a taking). But cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958) (statute which prohibited mining of coal was not considered a taking due to the
need for mining equipment and laborers during wartime).
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cess easements to private bodies of water provided by an imposi-
tion of a navigational servitude to allow access to public water-
ways."' Kaiser Aetna v. United States27 involved the imposition of an
access easement on what was previously a closed body of water.
The petitioners had developed land around a privately owned
pond, and had provided access to the ocean from the pond."" The
government maintained that the development of access to the
ocean had given the pond the status of a navigable waterway, and
therefore required the petitioners to allow public access to their
man-made inlet.1s The Court noted that the improvements had
not resulted in making the pond a navigable waterway,30 and re-
fused to allow the government to impose a navigational servitude
without payment of just compensation.3 ' Although commentators
have had differing views on the value of the Kaiser Aetna decision,
" See Note, The Navigation Servitude: Post Kaiser-Aetna Confusion, 20 VAL U.L. REv. 445,
445 (1986) (valid imposition of navigational servitude falls within exception to the fifth
amendment's just compensation requirement). See also United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) (basis for the power to impose a navigational servitude is that
private ownership of the water in a stream, not completely on the individual's land, is not
recognized); Morris, The Federal Navigation Servitude: Impediment to the Development of the
Waterfront, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 189, 189 (1970) ("navigation servitude is the paramount
right of the federal governnent, under the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, to compel the removal of any obstruction to navigation, without the necessity of pay-
ing 'just compensation' ordinarily required by the fifth amendment of the Constitution").
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
I d. at 166-67. Kaiser Aetna had developed a community which housed approximately
22,000 people on Kuapa Pond. Id. at 167. The pond had originally been only two feet
deep, and was separated from a bay leading to the ocean by a barrier beach. Id. at 166-67.
Through dredging and the creation of an opening in the barrier beach, the developers
gave residents of the community access to the Pacific Ocean from the pond. Id. at 167.
Id. at 168. The Army Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army had author-
ity to regulate navigable waterways in the United States by virtue of section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. Id. at 169.
30 Id. at 178-79. Although the Army Corps of Engineers could have refused to permit
the petitioners to dredge the pond due to the impediment to navigation in the adjacent
navigable waterways, they could not regulate the private property which was linked to a
navigable waterway once the permit had been approved. Id. at 179.
31 Id. at 179-80. The Court recognized certain "expectancies embodied in the concept of
'property,' " and held that the right to exclude others from entering one's property was
such a "universally ... fundamental element" of property ownership, that the government
could not enforce a regulation in derogation of this right without the payment of just com-
pensation. Id. The private property character of the pond had survived the development,
therefore the creation of a navigational servitude would be a physical invasion of privately
owned property. Id. at 180.
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and the rationale of its holding,8 ' it seems apparent that the Court
followed the long-standing doctrine that physical invasions of pri-
vate property create an obligation of just compensation under the
Constitution. 8
In contrast to the aforementioned cases in which a physical in-
vasion resulted in a tangible effect on the property owner's use
and enjoyment of his land,'4 is the case of Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp."' In Loretto, a state statute prohibited land-
lords from interfering with cable television installations.36 The ap-
pellant had discovered cable television wires and equipment at-
tached to a building which she had recently purchased, and
brought an action requesting just compensation." The Court
enunciated a per se rule which would require just compensation
for a "permanent physical occupation" of property." The per se
See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 184 (holding was a misuse of diminution in value test);
Note, supra note 26, at 466-67 (some commentators criticized the case as an addition to the
confusion surrounding the takings issue, others believed it put a needed limitation on the
government's power to impose servitudes).
" See supra note 31 (rationale of the holding in Kaiser Aetna). See also Note, supra note 1,
at 176 (just compensation is the proper remedy for a physical invasion).
8 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 170-78 (1979) (navigational
servitude would violate the fundamental right to exclude others); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 260-67 (1946) (airplane overflights made land commercially useless and un-
inhabitable); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871) (flooding
permanently and irreparably damaged plaintiffs land).
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 828(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987). The statute prohibits landlords from
interfering with cable installations in their buildings, and from accepting any payment
from a cable television company for an amount greater than what the commission has
deemed reasonable. Id.
" Loretto, 458 U.S. at 424. The appellant had bought an apartment building in New
York City without knowing that the previous owner had given a cable television company
permission to affix cable equipment to the building and the exclusive right to provide pay
television service to the tenants in the building. Id. at 421-22.
The Court of Appeals of New York referred to the legislation proscribing payments to
landlords by cable television companies by finding that a taking had not occurred. Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 140, 423 N.E.2d 320, 327, 440
N.Y.S.2d 843, 849-50 (1981).
" Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. Despite the public interest or benefit, and authorization by
the legislature, the Court maintained that a permanent physical occupation amounted to a
taking. Id. The Court noted the narrow scope of its holding, in that the per se rule applied
only to the physical occupation of property which was of a permanent character. Id. at 441.
The holding was further limited by the statement that it would "in no way alter the analy-
sis governing the state's power to require landlords to comply with building codes and
provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in
the common area of a building." Id. at 440.
Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the majority's distinction be-
tween "temporary physical invasions" and "permanent physical occupations" was nothing
more than "formalistic quibble" which could lead to dangerous results due to the Court's
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rule set forth in Loretto was an attempt by the Court to clarify the
takings issue, but in fact resulted in no more than adding confu-
sion to the already muddled list of precedents.3"
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement regarding the
physical invasion aspect of takings occurred in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission." In this case, an application was made to a
state regulatory agency for a permit to replace a bungalow on
oceanfront property with a larger home."' Over the Nollans' ob-
jections, the agency granted the permit subject to the condition
that the owners allow the public lateral access across their prop-
erty.'2 Ultimately, the condition to the permit was held to be con-
stitutional by the California Court of Appeal, and the Supreme
Court of California denied a petition for review.' The petitioners
then sought review by the United States Supreme Court, which
response to changing social problems with rigid per se rules. Id. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun provided the information that the actual wire and equipment
in question consisted of 36 feet of one-half inch thick cable which was strung down the side
of the appellant's building, and two metal boxes which were four inch cubes attached to
the top of the structure. Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Mulligan, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation: Another
Excursion into the Takings Dilemma, 17 URB. LAW. 109, 126-34 (1985) (discussion of the issues
left unresolved by Loretto, such as whether a balancing test may be used in such a case,
whether legislative determination should be taken into account, and the continuation of
confusion after the decision); Casenote, New Per Se Taking Rule Short Circuits Cable Televi-
sion Installations in New York: Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation, 25
B.C.L. REv. 459, 479-93 (1984) (inflexible rule of Loretto is inconsistent with previous cases,
and not adaptable to issues arising in modern urban settings).
40 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
" Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3143 (1987). See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 721, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (1986). The
bungalow which had fallen into disrepair was a one-story, 521 square foot "substandard"
beach house, and was to be replaced with a two-story, 1,674 square foot residence consist-
ing of three bedrooms and an attached two car garage. Id.
"I Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3143-44 (1987). A lateral
beach access is one which runs parallel to the shoreline as opposed to a roadway access
which runs from the nearest shore to the nearest roadway. KNOX, CAL R.E.L. & PRACCE §
513.25, at 258-59 (Supp. Aug. 1987).
The California Coastal Commission had statutory authority to impose lateral access re-
straints as conditions for the approval of any new development projects built along the
coastline. CAL PuB. REs. CODE A, § 30212 (Deering 1986).
4" Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986).
While the case was being appealed from a Superior Court opinion which removed the con-
dition from the permit, the Nollans tore down the bungalow and built the planned resi-
dence on the property. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3144
(1987).
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noted probable jurisdiction."
In reversing the holding of the California Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that the condition
imposed by the state agency resulted in a taking."' Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, equated the condition attached to the
permit to the facts present in Loretto." While relying on existing
precedents which have held that "permanent physical occupa-
tions" constitute takings, the majority proposed the use of a
"nexus" test, which requires a very close relationship between the
permit condition imposed and the problem to be remedied, for
determining the validity of the condition.4 7 Considering the facts
in Nollan in light of the "nexus" test, the majority held that the
requirement imposed did not satisfy this test." Although some
commentators have claimed that this case altered the law of tak-
'44 107 S. Ct. 312 (1986).
" Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 (1987). The characterization of a public easement across
the owner's property as a "'mere restriction on its use'" was inconsistent with the ordi-
nary meaning of the term. Id. (citation omitted). The Court noted that eminent domain
principles require just compensation for the imposition of such an easement. Id.
" Id. The Court analogized the easement, by virtue of which "individuals [were) given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro," to the permanent physical occupation
which had occurred in Loretto. Id. Although no individual had a right to station himself
permanently on the easement, unlike the cable equipment affixed to the building in Loretto,
the fact that the property could be continuously traversed made the easement a permanent
physical occupation, and therefore a taking. Id.
41 Id. at 3148. The Court stated that the condition must serve the same purpose as the
governmental ban on building in order for the regulation to be valid. Id. If the condition
failed to serve that purpose, the refusal to grant the permit absent the condition would be
"'an out-and-out plan of extortion." Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson,
121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
Justice Scalia's test set forth in Nollan imposed a requirement of a "nexus" between the
condition to a building permit, and the predicted problem which the construction would
create. Nollan 107 S. Ct. at 3149. Although the test requires a very close relationship be-
tween the condition and the problem, the Court failed to elaborate on the "characteristics
of the required 'nexus.'" Best, The Supreme Court Becomes Serious About Takings Law: Nollan
Sets New Rules for Exactions, 10 ZONING & PLAN. L. RiEP. 153, 153-55 (1987).
_" Notian, 107 S. Ct. at 3149. The Commission claimed that the Nollans' proposed house
would interfere with the public's access to the beach by creating a psychological barrier to
people driving down the road parallel to the coast. Id. at 3148-49. The Court found it to
be completely illogical that in order to remedy the "psychological barrier" the Nollans
would be required to allow people who were already on an adjacent public beach to walk
across their property. Id. at 3149.
Justice Scalia noted a peculiarity in the physical invasion analysis in his statement that a
condition requiring the Nollans to provide drivers with a viewing spot on their property in
order to remedy the psychological barrier to the beach would not have been a taking de-
spite the fact that it would result in a physical invasion. Id.
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ings,4 9 it can be viewed merely as an affirmance of the existing
case law.5 0
B. Nuisance Theory
Soon after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, state
nuisance abatement statutes were challenged before the Supreme
Court as violative of the takings clause." Most notable of these
challenges came in Mugler v. Kansas5 2 which questioned the valid-
ity of a state statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alco-
hol.53 Relying on Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.," the plaintiff brewery
owners argued that since the statute all but destroyed the value of
their businesses, there was a physical invasion of the property
which required compensation. The Court sustained the statute,
49 See, e.g., Merrill, Takings Clause Re-Emerges, But No Clear Pattern Seen, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
17, 1987, at S-8, col. 2 (Nollan limited power of state and local government to impose
conditions on property developments when restrictions were unrelated to harm posed by
development); Morris, Supreme Court Land Use Decisions Uncertain in Defining a "Taking,"
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 7, 1987, at 20, col. I (Nollan set new standard which was limited by subse-
quent holdings).
See Sax, Nollan No Bombshell: Property Rights in the Supreme Court, 3 CAL. WATERFRONT
AGE 6, 6 (1987), reprinted in 1987 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN, 1156, 1156.
Professor Sax noted that the Nollan decision "did little more than to reaffirm the standard
rules of land law that have long governed the country, and to bring California back in line
with the mainstream legal doctrine." Id.
"i See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80-81 (1872). In deciding whether a
Louisiana statute which provided that livestock and slaughterhouses be limited to certain
proscribed areas comported with the fourteenth amendment, the Court held that the re-
straint imposed on the free exercise of the livestock and butcher trade was not an action-
able deprivation of property. Id. Relying on the writings of Chancellor Kent, Justice Miller
wrote that it is the obligation of the legislature, acting under its police power, to interdict
"unwholesome trades, slaughterhouses and operations offensive to the senses." Id. at 62.
Under the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment provided in the Slaughter House
opinion, "states were left all but as free to regulate the rights of property and person as
they had been before the Civil War." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 32. In The License
Cases, Chief Justice Taney upheld the state's prohibition of liquor which was predicated on
the view that spirits were morally injurious to its citizens. See also The License Cases, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 504, 577 (1847). In a concurring opinion Justice McLean noted that the
"acknowledged police power of a state extends often to the destruction of property" in the
abatement of a nuisance. Id. at 589.
U 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Is d. at 653-58. Mugler and co-defendant Ziebold & Hagelin owned established brewer-
ies and had been engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer for several years. Id. Both
were indicted for operating without a permit and unlawfully selling intoxicants. Id.
, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of Pumpelly decision).
"Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
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distinguishing the legitimacy of a regulation which prohibits a
public nuisance from a regulation resulting in a physical invasion
of private property." Moreover, the state was held to possess the
power to declare that any property maintained or operated for
the illegal manufacture or sale of liquor constituted a nuisance to
be abated by confiscation and if necessary, destruction of property
for the protection of the public. 7
In succeeding cases, the Supreme Court continued to uphold
land use regulations which retroactively prohibited profitable uses
of property, on grounds that their continued existence would be
injurious to the public health and safety. 8 In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
" Id. at 671-72. The Court distinguished statutes which "attempt to deprive persons
who come within its provisions of property . . . without due process of law" from those
statutes which are enacted "[to abate] a common nuisance." Id. at 671.
5" Id. at 661-63. Section 13 of the statute in question required that the sheriff "shut up
and abate such place" where liquor was manufactured or sold by "taking possession
thereof and destroying all intoxicating liquors found therein together with all signs,
screens, bars, bottles, glasses, and other property used in keeping and maintaining said
nuisance . . . " Id. at 670.
Denial of compensation on the ground that the adversely affected interest was not really
a property right protected by the fourteenth amendment was incident to Mugler v. Kansas
and continues to be common in the case law. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 51 (1964). This "no-compensation because no-property" approach permitted legis-
latures to prohibit by statute enterprises which fell into popular disfavor notwithstanding
the disastrous consequences to the affected owners. Id. at 52. See also Stoebuck, supra note
8,.at 1061 (Mugler v. Kansas stands for "noxious use" test of taking which holds that regu-
lation on land which controls some evil or noxious use which landowner is making of land,
cannot amount to taking).
See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 409-10 (1915). In Hadacheck, a land-
owner constructed and operated a brick manufacturing facility on land containing clay
worth $800,000 for brickmaking purposes. Id. at 405. The clay was worth only $60,000 if
used for any other purpose. Id. At the time of purchase, Hadacheck's land was in a remote
location outside the City of Los Angeles. Id. at 404-05. The city enacted an ordinance
making it unlawful to operate a brick manufacturing establishment within the city's limits,
which then had been extended to include the petitioner's property. Id. The Supreme
Court sustained the ordinance despite the fact that Hadacheck was compelled to abandon
his business and deprived of the use of his property. Id. at 413-14. Hadacheck and most
early cases involved ordinances which excluded noxious uses from designated areas, and
these were upheld when they "required anything less than destruction of the entire inter-
est of the landowner." See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 83-85. See also Reinman v. City
of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1914). In Reinman, a municipal ordinance made the
continued existence of a livery stable a nuisance, although it had been situated in the same
location for a number of years. Id. Despite the fact that relocation of the stables to a per-
missible location would be costly, the Supreme Court held that the declaration of the busi-
ness as a nuisance was in fact and in law a proper exercise of the police power. Id. at 176.
The Court, in dicta, warned however, that if a future regulation on business was unreason-
able, arbitrary or discriminatory., such a regulation would infringe upon rights guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment and be deemed invalid. Id. at 177.
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v. Mahon" however, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, de-
parted from the prevailing view by considering not only the legiti-
macy of the exercise of police power, but also the economic im-
pact of a statute on the property owner."
Pennsylvania Coal involved a dispute over a state statute which
prohibited the mining of coal in such a manner as to cause subsi-
dence of structures." Since the operation of the statute made the
mining of coal by the plaintiffs impracticable, the statute was held
by the Court to be an unconstitutional taking of the company's
property and contract rights to mine.6 Justice Holmes noted that
the statute effectively destroyed the subsurface mining rights
which the company had reserved by contract, thereby transferring
them to surface property owners without compensation and in vi-
In Miller v. Schoene, the Court upheld a state order which required an owner to remove a
large number of ornamental red cedar trees growing on his property as a means of
preventing the communication to nearby apple orchards of a plant disease with which the
red cedars were infected. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1928). The cutting of
the trees took place pursuant to a state statute (Cedar Rust Act of Virginia) and the owner
of the cedars was not compensated. Id. The Court, in upholding the state order, reasoned
that the value of the apple orchards, the state's principal agricultural pursuit, far out-
weighed the value of the cedars which, infected with the fungus, were a nuisance which
required abatement for the protection of the state's fiscal welfare. Id. at 279.
A modern case which followed and revitalized the nuisance theory of takings was Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), in which the Supreme Court upheld
limitations upon the right of the landowner to excavate sand and gravel below the water-
line, even though the restriction prohibited the most beneficial use of the property. Id. at
591-92. The Court ruled that the landowner failed to sustain its burden of showing that
the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. Id. at 596.
- 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 413. Justice Holmes stated that one fact for consideration in determining the
limits of the police power is the extent to which rights to property or contract are dimin-
ished by the regulation in question. Id.
Pennsylvania Coal marked the first indication of judicial concern for economic loss in
land-use regulation and was the source for the "diminution in value rule." D. MANDELKER,
ENviRoNMENT AND EQurrY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE 45 (1981).
" Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13. Pennsylvania's Kohler Act forbade the mining
of coal in such a way as to cause subsidence damage of enumerated structures including
private residences. Id. The statute was enacted after the coal company deeded surface land
rights to the Mahons, subject to a waiver of subsidence damage claims, but retained mining
rights to the sub-surface estate. Id. The state recognized both a surface estate and a sub-
surface estate in land, and the two estates were not required to be owned by the same
person. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1249-50 (1987).
Under the Kohler Act, if the surface estate and the mineral rights were jointly owned, the
owner of the mineral estate could cause subsidence to the surface estate, however, if the
two were separately owned, the owner of the sub-surface estate could not mine the mineral
estate in such a way as to cause subsidence to the surface estate of the owner's property. Id.
" Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-15.
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olation of the fourteenth amendment."s Pennsylvania Coal left an
indelible mark on the law of takings by abandoning the strict nui-
sance view set forth in Mugler v. Kansas" and examining the ex-
tent of the diminution of value on the land regulated." By the
early 1900's, it became clear that nuisance suits were inadequate
remedies for the promotion of social goals, and that a more sys-
tematic approach was required." Rapid population growth neces-
sitated the development of zoning regulations aimed at the con-
63 Id. at 415-16. In the dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that every exercise of the police
power necessarily results in "an abridgment by the state of rights in private property with-
out making compensation," and that any restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety, or morals is not a taking. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis reiterated the
prevailing view that an exercise of the police power which prohibited a noxious use of
property for the protection of the public could never be a taking. Id. at 418 (citing Mugler
v. Kansas, 12- U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411-12
(1915)).
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. In what has become a takings maxim, Justice
Holmes noted that "[t]he general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking." Id. "We are in
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the consitiutional way of
paying for the change." Id. Justice Holmes further noted that the takings analysis is a
"question of degree and cannot be disposed of by general propositions." Id. See R. EpsrEIN,
supra note 2, at 102 (since Mahon, the dominant line of opinion has been that regulations
are "outside the scope of eminent domain unless taken 'too far' ").
The "too far" test of regulatory takings has dominated subsequent case law opinions. See,
e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3156 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). See Stoebuck, supra note 8, at 1069, 1081 ("the 'too far' test reduces the takings
question to a matter of degree and a mixed question of law and fact, much like a test of
reasonableness").
" See D. MANDELKER, supra note 60, at 45. Following the economic loss theory enunci-
ated in Pennsylvania Coal, many courts have applied the "diminution in value test" in ana-
lyzing the validity of land use controls, such as zoning. Id. Under this rule, a court will not
generally find a taking unless property value losses are substantial. Id. See also Sax, supra
note 57, at 41 (degree of economic harm a "critical factor" in the diminution theory);
Note, Development in the Law of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1477-78 (1978) (classic ex-
pression of diminution of value theory test was set forth in Pennsylvania Coal, which re-
flected an important shift in the concept of limits of police power away from noxiousness of
property use to economic impact on the landowner). Cf Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the
Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle, 57 S. CAL L. REV. 561, 566 (1984) (test fails to inform us as
to "how much diminution of value is too much").
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Coal decision has been credited with the first "balancing
test" for takings when it was written that government action may be sustained where it
secures the "average reciprocity of advantage" of all interested parties. Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 415.
" See Note, supra note 65, at 1427, 1433. Nuisance actions were generally too expensive
a recourse for many individuals injured by neighboring property and were available only to
the more litigious, affluent classes. Id. Due to the ad hoc nature of nuisance suits, social
goals such as urban growth limitations and environmental control were not met. Id.
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trol of building heights67 and the segregation of incompatible uses
of property." The constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning
plan was first challenged before the Supreme Court in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co."
In Euclid, the owner of a tract of land sought an injunction to
restrain the enforcement of a municipality's zoning ordinance 0 al-
leging that the local law violated the fourteenth amendment."1
The land in question was acquired and held by a realty company
for industrial use and development.7" The ordinance in question
restricted use of most of the tract to residential development,
thereby substantially reducing the value of the land.7" In finding
the zoning plan constitutional, the Court expressed the need to
broaden the permissible exercise of the police power to keep pace
with the growing complexity of civilization.7" Inspired by Euclid,
" See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1909) (statute which provided for a
lower height limitation on buildings in designated parts of the city was challenged as an
unreasonable exercise of the police power which the Court held was reasonable and justi-
fied by fire protection concerns of the city). See generally 4 E. YOKLEY, supra note 5, at 136
(early zoning cases which challenged regulations regarding height of buildings were gener-
ally upheld as a proper exercise of the police power).
" See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 1-3 (1982). In 1916, New York City became the
first municipality to adopt a comprehensive zoning plan which assigned land uses to zoning
districts throughout the city. Id. The purpose of the plan was to separate incompatible uses
of land by segregating the municipality into a number of zones, with the major classifica-
tions separating residential, commercial, and industrial uses. Id. The author noted that
"[c]ourts now recognize the division of a municipality into zoning districts... as an accept-
able police power." Id. at 3.
New York's comprehensive zoning plan was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals
in 1920. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 318-19, 128 N.E. 209,
210 (1920). In addition to New York, Wisconsin also held a zoning ordinance reasonable
and valid. State ex re. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 157, 196 N.W. 451, 454 (1923). See
generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 88 (in the decade following the adoption of the
New York City zoning ordinance, more than a dozen state courts reviewed their constitu-
tionality with mixed results).
" 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926). Euclid is considered the seminal zoning decision upholding
the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning. D. MANDELxER, supra note 68, at 27. See also
6 P. ROHAN, supra note 16, at §§ 44-1 to -2 (since Euclid, zoning has become an accepted
and legitimate tool for land use management).
" Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379-82. The zoning plan divided the village into districts desig-
nated by use (commercial, agricultural, industrial, residential, etc.), specified minimum lot
areas for construction, maximum building heights, and permissible signage. Id.
71 Id. at 384.
" Id. The land in question had a market value of ten thousand dollars per acre. Id.
" Id. The Company argued that the ordinance "reduced and destroyed" the value of
the land, then worth only twenty-five hundred dollars per acre, and constituted a cloud on
title. Id. at 385.
"' Id. at 392. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, pointed to the "increasing den-
Takings Clause Interpretation
municipalities extended the scope of their regulatory activites be-
yond mere nuisance abatement and land use zoning to include an
array of aesthetic objectives." Courts, in response to new statu-
tory enactments, enlarged the meaning of "public welfare" to ac-
commodate the promotion of more refined social needs.70 In light
of the expanding definition of public welfare, the Supreme Court,
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York," examined
whether programs aimed at the preservation of architectural
landmarks could impose regulations on the use and maintenance
of privately owned buildings without effecting a taking.
The New York Landmarks Preservation Commission7 8 desig-
nated Grand Central Terminal a "landmark" in recognition of its
sity of urban populations, the multiplying forms of industry," and the expanding complex-
ity of society as reasons for the state to correspondingly expand the police power "within
reasonable bounds to meet the changing conditions." Id.
The Court found that segregation of residential, commercial, and industrial property
would increase the safety and security of "home life," reduce traffic and traffic related
accidents involving children, decrease noise and "preserve a more favorable environment
in which to rear children." Id. at 394. But cf. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1'928) (zoning ordinance which imposed residential use restriction on plaintiff's land was
held to be a taking due to lack of necessity for zoning designation and lack of any rational
relationship between the designation and the promotion of the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare).
"' See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927) (zoning ordinance which required
plaintiff to set back a proposed building 35 feet from the street was held to be valid as it
furthered legitimate police power objectives related to public health (light and air), safety
(fire prevention and traffic safety), and the public welfare (attractiveness and comfort of the
residential district)).
" See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). Justice Douglas expanded the meaning
of public welfare when he stated in dicta:
The public . . . welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legisla-
ture to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spa-
cious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled . . . .If those who
govern decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there
is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Id. See also City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (state may
legitimately exercise its police powers to advance aesthetic needs).
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
7 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977). The State authorized its local gov-
ernments to impose reasonable restrictions to preserve structures and areas with special
historical or aesthetic interest or value. Id. See also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 25-301 (1986).
The Landmarks Preservation Law was adopted in 1965 pursuant to the Enabling Act to
"protect and enhance" designated historic districts, and landmark buildings "for the edu-
cation, pleasure, and welfare of the City." Id. The Commission was charged with the ad-
ministration of the law which included the identification, designation and approval of im-
provements or alterations to landmark buildings. Id. at § 25-303.
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distinguished Beaux-Arts architectural design." Subsequently, the
building's owner applied to the Commission for approval to con-
struct an office tower atop its existing railroad terminal.80 The
Commission rejected the proposal 81 and the owner filed suit, seek-
ing injunctive relief on the basis that the Commission's disap-
proval constituted an uncompensated taking and a deprivation of
property without due process." Affirming the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court held
there was no compensable taking. 8 The Court noted that the
Commission's acts were "reasonably related" to the implementa-
tion of a comprehensive plan to preserve historic and aesthetically
79 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 166 n.16. The property was designated a landmark in 1967
over the objections of its owner, Penn Central, but no judicial review of the Board of
Estimate's affirmation of the designation was sought. Id.
"O Id. at 116-17. Penn Central had entered into a multi-million dollar lease agreement
with a British co-venturer to construct a 53-55 story office building in an effort to enhance
its financial position. Id. Both the lessor, Penn Central, and lessee submitted two architec-
tural plans for the office tower to the Commission. Id.
" Id. at 118. The Commission found that the addition of a modern 55 story office tower
above the 1916 terminal was "an aesthetic joke" as "the Tower would overwhelm the Ter-
minal by its sheer mass ... reducing the Landmark itself to the status of a curiosity." Id.
" Id. at 119. The New York Supreme Court granted an injunction barring the
Landmarks Law from impeding the construction. Id. Upon the Commission's appeal, the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed. Penn Cent. v. City of New
York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 275, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 29-30 (1st Dep't 1975). The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that there could be no taking without a complete
transfer of control from the railroad to the city. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 922 (1977).
" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. The owner argued that unlike the landowners in the
classic nuisance abatement cases of Hadacheck, Miller and Goldblatt, its proposed office
tower would not be noxious, but rather beneficial to the general public. Id. at 133-34 n.30.
The Court cast aside Penn Central's distinction, asserting that the nuisance abatement reg-
ulations in those cases were sustained because the restrictions were reasonably related to
the promotion of the public good, and not sustained for the purpose of punishing a wrong-
doer. Id. See Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for
Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and a Resolution of the Regulatory Taking Impasse, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 742 (1978). In rejecting the Pennsylvania Coal view that only a noxious
use prevention could support a prohibition of the most beneficial use of the property with-
out resulting in a taking, the Court analogized the purpose of the Landmark Law with that
of the long sanctioned objectives of Euclidean zoning. Id. Despite Justice Brennan's asser-
tion that the nuisance abatement regulations were not sustained to punish wrongdoers,
commentators view the rationale of the nuisance cases as remedying an evil or noxious use
of property. See, e.g., R. E'srm, supra note 2, at 112 (a public nuisance is a wrong against
individuals, each of whom suffers compensable harms, which the state controls by regula-
tions to vindicate individual rights).
The Court similarly rejected Penn Central's attempt to analogize the facts to the physical
invasion case of United States v. Causby. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104. See supra notes 21-25
and accompanying text (discussion and analysis- of Causby).
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significant structures." In addition, the owner was found not to
have suffered any diminution of its primary investment-backed ex-
pectations.1 The Penn Central case is significant for its approval of
aesthetic regulatory activity, the scope of which permitted a city
agency to place restrictions on the development of individual par-
cels of historic property in furtherance of aesthetic preservation
considerations."
Recently, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,87
the Supreme Court revisited the coal mines of Pennsylvania. Like
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Keystone presented a constitutional
challenge to a state statute that required coal mining companies to
take precautionary measures to prevent surface subsidence dam-
age during and after mining operations." The petitioners repre-
" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-34 n.30. The Court stated, "the restrictions were rea-
sonably related to the implementation of a policy ...expected to produce a widespread
public benefit ... ."Id.
'" Id. at 136. The Court found that the New York City law did not prevent Penn Central
from profiting or obtaining a reasonable return on its investment. Id. Moreover, the Court
noted that Penn Central could use the developmental air rights at eight other building
parcels it owned in the vicinity to mitigate any financial burdens resulting from the
landmark status. Id. at 137.
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 83, at 731, 750 (decision has invigorated municipal efforts
to preserve aesthetic, historical, and cultural landmarks at a minimum cost to the taxpay-
ers). See also D. MANDELKER, supra note 60, at 44 (decision reflects the view that land use
regulation which "implements subjective environmental values is constitutional").
Justice Brennan also acknowledged that in over 100 years of takings review, the Supreme
Court had failed to enunciate a "set formula" for determining when a taking occurs. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124. "This Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportion-
ately concentrated on a few persons." Id. The takings analysis then is an "ad hoc, factual
-inquiry which depends largely upon the particular circumstances of the case." Id. (citing
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)). See Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (each takings case must "turn on its own facts").
The consequence of this ad hoc approach to the takings issue has been labeled by one
commentator as a 'crazy quilt pattern' of Supreme Court doctrine. Dunham, Griggs v. Al-
legheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT.
REV. 63, 63 (1962). See Note, supra note 65, at 1464 (decisional law on the takings clause
has been "hopelessly confused"). See also Wright, Exclusionary Land Use Controls and the
Takings Issue, 8 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 545, 563 (1983) (legal scholars are in search of a "set
of rules which will lend precision to a process which is doomed to imprecision by the state
of the law").
a 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
" Id. at 1237. Before the statute was passed, coal companies were able to obtain waivers
for subsidence damage from surface owners. Id. Such waivers permitted the maximum ex-
traction of minable coal. Id. See Note, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedic-
tis: A Regulatory Taking? 89 W. VA. L REV. 803, 808 (1987). As a result of the statute and
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sented mining companies which had purchased sub-surface min-
eral estates from surface owners, subject to waivers for any
damage caused to the surface as a result of mining activity.' The
petitioners argued that the mere enactment of the state legislation
constituted a violation of the takings clause of the Constitution,"
pursuant to the Court's interpretation of that clause in Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v. Mahon." In its opinion, the Court distinguished
Pennsylvania Coal from the facts in Keystone by first contrasting the
state statute involved in each.' The Court, in a five to four deci-
certain implementing regulations, the surface owners had the right of "subjacent support"
regardless of any pre-existing contractual waiver. Id.
The Act prohibited mining which resulted in subsidence damage to public buildings,
non-commercial buildings used by the public, residences, and cemetaries. Bituminous Mine,
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon 1966 &
Supp. 1987). After enactment of the act, the Department of Environmental Protection,
enforcement agency for the Act, required that coal companies leave behind at least 50% of
the coal beneath the structures enumerated in the statute to provide surface support. Key-
stone, 107 S. Ct. at 1237-38. The Act required that any coal company causing damage to a
surface structure to compensate the surface owner within six months or risk loss of its
mining permit. Id. at 1238.
a Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1238.
00 Id. at 1239. The Association contended that the section four 50% rule and the section
six damage compensation requirement violated the takings clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, and that section six impaired its existing contractual agreements in
violation of Article [, section 10 of the Constitution. Id.
01 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
"Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242. Since the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal was aimed at
the protection of property rights for a favored few, and did not seek to abate a common or
public nuisance, the Act was struck down. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14. The Sub-
sidence Act in issue in Keystone was viewed by Justice Stevens as an enactment which was
aimed at the protection of the "public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal
integrity of the area." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243. Once the Court labeled coal mining
activity a public nuisance, it was able to invoke the rule of such nuisance precedents as
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1914); and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), which consistently held that
prohibitions which seek to abate uses of property deemed injurious to the health, safety, or
morals of a community could not be adjudged a taking. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1244-45.
The Subsidence Act, according to Justice Stevens, could be "understood on the simple
theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others, the statute has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to
enjoin the nuisance-like activity." Id. at 1245 n.20.
A second distinguishing factor was the failure of the Association to show any diminution
of value and investment-backed expectations resulting from the legislation. Id. at 1247.
Unlike the Pennsylvania Coal Company, which stood to lose the entire value of its subsur-
face mineral estate, the Association neither pleaded nor proved any damages, choosing
instead to make a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Act. Id. The Court as-
serted that the test to be applied in facial challenges was whether the statute "denies an
owner economically viable use of his land .... '" Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
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sion, ruled that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police
power, and as there was no economic deprivation suffered by the
owners of the mineral estate, there was no taking."
Both the majority and the dissent, while differing on whether
the coal mining activity should be labeled a public nuisance, rec-
ognized that an "exception" to the takings guarantee exists when
government seeks to prevent a misuse or illegal use." This nui-
sance exception, first declared in Mugler v. Kansas," has subse-
quently been narrowed, and now applies only when there is less
than total destruction of all profitable use of the subject
property."
Despite the fact that there has been no "bright line" leading
the way to a regulatory taking determination, two doctrines have
emerged from the case law which continue to be applied in the
takings analysis. The first is the physical invasion theory which
states that all exercises of the police power which result in a per-
manent physical occupation of private property are takings.97 This
doctrine was most recently applied in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, where it was held that the Commission's easement
U.S. 225, 260 (1980)). Since the Association had advanced no claim of commercial imprac-
ticability or loss of profits on the mining of coal, the statute was upheld as constitutional.
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1250-51.
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246, 1251. The contracts clause challenge was similarly laid to
rest. Id. at 1251-53. The Court agreed that the statute impaired the contractual relation-
ship between the coal companies and the surface owners, but found that the police power
objective and public interest were strong enough to overcome the private agreements be-
tween the parties. Id. at 1252.
The dissent found the facts under review and the Act in question "strikingly similar" to
those in Pennsylvania Coal. Id. at 1253 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that
in distinguishing the Kohler Act from the Subsidence Act, the majority undermined the
authority of Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal and called into question the hold-
ing which "for 55 years [had] been the foundation of 'our regulatory takings jurispru-
dence.' " Id. at 1253-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent found that the
Subsidence Act was "not the type of regulation that our precedents have held to be within
the 'nuisance exception' to the takings analysis." Id. at 1256 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1245, 1256.
" 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Compare Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69 (nuisance abatement legislation never amounts to
a taking if its sole object is to protect the welfare of the society) with Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (nuisance prohibitions which destroy all viable use
of property constitute takings) and Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1250 (statute which regulates a
public nuisance will be upheld absent claim by property owner of commercial impractica-
bility or loss of profits).
' See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussion of modern physical invasion
theory).
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condition requiring the Nollans to allow the public to pass on a
portion of private beach was tantamount to a physical occupation
of the property and thus a taking." Conversely, the nuisance doc-
trine has operated as an exception to the fifth amendment takings
clause guarantee, and maintains that an exercise of the police
power aimed at the abatement of a noxious use of property is
never a taking, unless the property owner's rights are completely
destroyed." Keystone exemplified the continued vitality of this
common-law doctrine.100
The application of these doctrines has not been consistent how-
ever. The takings question has always been approached on an ad
hoc basis, and the Supreme Court has been reluctant to formulate
any guidelines or tests for determining the constitutionality of a
regulation.10 1 Commentators have suggested any number of "tak-
ing tests" which the courts have either rejected or have imple-
mented in a random fashion.'" It is submitted that this unstruc-
tured approach to the takings question has been further
compounded by the recent decision in First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. County of Los Angeles.10
" 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987).
" See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussion of nuisance theory).
100 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
101 See supra note 86 (discussion of confused state of case law on takings). Attempts by
the Court to clarify the law in this area have led in many circumstances to added confusion.
See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148-50 (1987) (after find-
ing that a physical occupation which constituted an uncompensated taking had taken place,
the Court went on to develop the "nexus" test); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (Court drew a distinction between a temporary
physical invasion and a permanent physical occupation).
101 See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 86, at 63 (in every situation, landowner should be com-
pensated for diminution of value resulting from state regulation); Michelman, supra note 9,
at 1250 (compensation due only when there is a physical occupation or a nearly total de-
struction of "some ... value"); Stoebuck, supra note 5, at 1062-65 (regulation effects a
taking if its objective is directed at "benefitting a governmental entity in the use of land
which that entity holds incidents of ownership"); Note, Taking Without Compensation
Through Compulsory Dedications - New Horizons for California Land Use Law: Associated Home
Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 5 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 218, 222 (1972) (economic harm to
landowner balanced against public necessity). See also Sax, supra note 57, at 63. Professor
Sax's approach would allow the state to regulate land in its role as arbiter of disputes, but if
the regulation enhanced the state's resource position in its enterprise capacity, the state
would be required by the Constitution to pay compensation. Id.
101 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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II. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE First English DECISION
The amorphous definition of a taking may place an unfair bur-
den on municipalities and zoning boards which must now compen-
sate a property owner for a temporary taking under the holding
in First English.104 In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a
seven year old state supreme court ruling that just compensation
was not a possible remedy for a temporary regulatory taking.'05
In First English, the appellant had purchased land on the bank
of a creek in Los Angeles, upon which was operated a camp for
handicapped children.'06 After a flood destroyed all of the build-
ings on the campground, the county passed an ordinance which
prohibited construction in an "interim flood area,"''4 in which
the appellant's property was located.'" The appellant filed a com-
plaint alleging that it had been denied all use of its property, and
sought damages due to an unconstitutional taking.'*9
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Su-
perior Court of California rejecting the appellant's cause of action
for damages." 0 Both state courts followed existing precedent and
held that the only available remedy for alleged temporary regula-
tory takings was either declaratory relief or mandamus."' The
church appealed to the United States Supreme Court after being
x' Id.
50 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979),
affd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). This case held that the use of inverse condem-
nation seeking money damages was not a remedy for temporary regulatory takings. Id. at
278, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
106 First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2381. The church had run the camp, Lutherglen, on a
twelve acre plot of land in the natural drainage area of Angeles National Forest. Id.
" Los Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance 11,855 Uan. 11, 1979). The ordinance pro-
vided that no "person shall . . . construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or
structure, any portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the
interim flood protection area." Id. It went on to state that its immediate effectuation was
necessary due to the urgency of the situation and the danger to public health and safety.
Id.
1o First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2382.
106 Id.
110 Id.
"I Id. at 2382-83. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275, 598 P.2d 25, 29-
30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376-77 (1979). Due to increased development in cities, and the
need for municipalities' freedom to zone as they see fit, the court viewed the awarding of
money damages in inverse condemnation actions as "an inappropriate and undesirable
remedy in cases in which unconstitutional regulation is alleged." Id.
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denied review by the Supreme Court of California.' In a six to
three decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court held that an action by government which acts as a taking of
property requires just compensation even if it is of a temporary
nature.1 s
The Court avoided deciding the issue of whether a taking had
occurred by relying on a literal reading of the California Court of
Appeal's rejection of the appellant's claim.1 1' Therefore, the only
issue addressed was whether the Agins rule limiting the remedies
for a temporary taking was consistent with the just compensation
requirement of the fifth and fourteenth amendments." 5 The
Court found that it was not.? 6
The holding in First English was foreshadowed by Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,"7
and more recently by several other inverse condemnation cases."'
"' First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2383.
Is Id. at 2389. "[Wlhere the government's activities have already worked a taking of all
use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective." Id.
114 Id. at 2382-85. Since the California Court of Appeal had rejected the appellant's
claim because it was "one seeking 'damages for the uncompensated taking of all use of
Lutherglen' " the majority found that it did not have to decide whether in fact a taking
had occurred. Id.
... Id. at 2385. The appellees objected to the reasoning used to arrive at the issue for
review, but the Court rejected their suggestions and left the question of whether the ordi-
nance had actually worked a taking open for remand. Id. at 2384-85.
"I Id. at 2389.
117 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981). In this case, the Court was faced with an inverse condem-
nation claim made by a company which had bought land on which to construct a nuclear
power plant, but the land had been re-zoned as open space. Id. at 624-25. The California
courts used the Agins rule to strike down the company's claim without deciding whether a
taking had occurred. Id. at 631-32. The Supreme Court claimed that it lacked jurisdiction
to decide the constitutional issue of whether compensation was required since no final deci-
sion was made in the state court of whether the zoning worked a taking. Id. at 633. In his
dissent, Justice Brennan viewed the state court holding as final, and came to the conclusion
that if a "court finds that a police power regulation has effected a 'taking,' the government
entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation
first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind
or otherwise amend the regulation." Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (California
court's dismissal of claim on the basis of the Agins rule was not final since the issue of
whether a taking had occurred had not been decided); Id. at 2573 n.4 (White, J., dissent-
ing) (permissible to limit "liability for the taking to the interim period"); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 185-86 (1985) (Court
refused to decide whether just compensation was required for a regulatory taking since no
decision of whether the property had been taken was made, and the owner of the regu-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in First English virtually fol-
lowed Justice Brennan's dissent in the earlier case.11  The First
English opinion began with the recognition of a private right of
action in eminent domain cases which is guaranteed by the fifth
amendment.120 After reaffirming the fact that just compensation is
required for a taking, the majority proceeded to rely upon Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. to illus-
trate that takings may occur in the absence of condemnation pro-
ceedings."' The majority then addressed the issue of whether a
temporary taking brought about by regulation warranted compen-
sation." Through analogy to temporary physical invasion
cases," 5' the Court concluded that the constitutional guarantee of
just compensation applied to any temporary denial of all use of
lated property had not sought compensation through all available state procedures). See
also Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 505 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (considered
method proposed in San Diego Gas dissent to be persuasive); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley
Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.) (majority of court asserts that damages are
recoverable in inverse condemnation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983); D & R Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Green County, 630 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (certain lower
court decisions maintain that inverse condemnation may be permitted if regulation works a
taking).
Numerous commentators have recognized a trend by a plurality of the Supreme Court,
and have advised against accepting such a rationale. See, e.g., Sterk, Government Liability for
Unconstitutional Land Use Regulation, 60 IND. L.J 113, 157-58 (1985) (use of reasoning in
dissent of San Diego Gas would place an unfair burden on policy makers); Williams, Smith,
Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 194 (1984)
(plurality's belief that just compensation was required for constitutionally impermissible
regulation is unfounded); Note, Takings Law - Is Inverse Condemnation an Appropriate Remedy
for Due Process Violations? - San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 57 WAsH. L.
REv. 551, 571 (1982) (inverse condemnation proposed by minority in San Diego Gas was not
a valid remedy). But see Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme
Court's Search for a Solution Continues, 18 URa. LAW. 635, 656 (1986) (Justices Rehnquist and
Powell may no longer follow Justice Brennan's dissent).
"' Compare First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389 (government must "provide compensation
for the period during which the taking was effective") with San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 659
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (government is liable "for payment of compensation ... for the
interim during which the regulation effected a 'taking' ").
"0 First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2385-86.
121 Id.
'Id. at 2387.
"s Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 16 (1949) (temporary taking of
laundry company during wartime required just compensation); United States v. Petty Mo-
tor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946) (taking of a lease for the duration of World War 11
required just compensation); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381-84
(1945) (determination of amount of compensation to be paid for a lease temporarily taken
during war).
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property.'1
In his dissent, Justice Stevens opined that the majority's holding
would generate excessive and unproductive litigation.' The dis-
sent maintained that the majority should have addressed the issue
of whether a taking had in fact occurred, and suggested that if the
majority had done so the question would have been answered in
the negative." Justice Stevens further noted that the result of the
Court's holding would impede the passage of needed land use
regulations. 17
The right of property owners to enjoy their property without
interference is well entrenched in the law.'" It is suggested that
the First English decision reaffirmed public policy considerations
favoring the protection of an individual's property rights over the
municipality's interest in safeguarding the public welfare."3 It is
further submitted that the First English Court attempted to stem
the growth of the police power by imposing economic sanctions
for its misuse, without delineating the point at which a regulation
effects a taking. It is suggested that as a result, the threat of finan-
cial liability is apt to restrain state and local governments from
freely exercising the full measure of their regulatory authority to
insure community welfare.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and commentators had hoped that since the Supreme
1'4 First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
I" Id. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined in
certain portions of the dissent. Id. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I' ld. at 2390-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I ld. at 2399-400 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "It would be the better part of valor simply
to decide the case at hand instead of igniting the kind of litigation explosion that this
decision will undoubtedly touch off." Id. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussion of protections guaranteed by
takings clause of fifth amendment). See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
552 (1972) ("right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to
speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right"). See generally J. GEUN & D.
MILLER, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 101 (general overview of law of eminent domain and its
restrictions); J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTiTUTIONAL LAW § 11.11, at 399 (3d
ed. 1986) (limitations on exercise of eminent domain).
'" First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. The Court acknowledged that their holding would
limit the freedom and flexibility of land use planners to a degree, but concluded these
"consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of a constitutional
right." Id.
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Court had slated several takings cases for review during its 1986-
87 term, the Court was ready to enunciate a long awaited takings
test.3 Notwithstanding the trilogy of takings cases reviewed in
that term, the Supreme Court has yet to formulate a model to
determine when regulatory action rises to the level of an uncom-
pensated taking.13 1 The per se taking rule for "permanent physical
occupations"1 and the nuisance exception to the fifth amend-
ment guarantee of just compensation' 8 are the only two consis-
tent strands in this area of the law. It is submitted that most tak-
ings challenges do not fall within one of these two categories, and
the Court has followed a tradition of inconsistency in deciding
cases situated on the spectrum between these extremes. It is sug-
gested that in close cases, the Supreme Court has at times conve-
niently culled and utilized the opinions of commentators to sup-
port a pre-ordained result.'"
It is proposed that the Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les decisions have the combined effect of reversing the trend to-
180 See, e.g., Durham, MacDonald, Sommer and Frates v. Yolo County: The Supreme Court
Again Dodges The Inverse Condemnation Issue, 9 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 65, 72 (1986) (tak-
ings law was in flux, author hoped to see a clarification of the law in First English); Sailet,
supra note 118, at 651 (Supreme Court had opportunity to make the takings issue more
clear in its 1987 term).
181 See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 199 n.17 (1985) (determining when a regulation goes too far has been likened to the
"'lawyers equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark") (quoting C. HARR, LAND-USE
PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976)); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) ("[r]esolution of
each case ... ultimately calls as much for the exercise ofjudgment as for the application of
logic").
'' See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussion of holding in-Loretto).
18 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (under nuisance exception, state or lo-
cal government may regulate or restrict property rights to control public nuisance without
paying compensation, provided regulation does not deprive owner of all profitable or ben-
eficial use). The doctrine has been traced to the Slaughter House Cases of 1872 and was
most recently applied in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232,
1246-48 (1987).
I See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
The majority used an article by Professor Michelman to support the proposition that every
physical invasion is an incontestable case for compensation. Id. The dissent, however, used
the same article to support the claim that physical invasion is an outmoded concept. Id. at
447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
125-28 (1978). Professor Sax's 1964 article was cited to support the assertion that injury to
economic rights is not property deprivation for fifth amendment purposes, and Professor
Michelman's article was cited to support the assertion that a statute which furthers public
policy but frustrates "distinct" economic expectations is a taking. Id.
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ward increasingly flexible exercise of the police power in land use
planning and regulation. In Nollan, the Court drew in the reins of
the police power and reduced the scope of permissible regulatory
activity available to zoning and land use decision makers by impos-
ing the "nexus" requirement."" It is submitted that the First En-
glish decision, standing alone, is well reasoned and historically jus-
tified; but rather than grasp the opportunity to define when a
regulation constitutes a taking, the First English Court established
a rule which required monetary compensation for temporary reg-
ulatory takings1 6 Consequently, a judicial declaration invalidat-
ing a land use regulation exposes a governmental entity to poten-
tially debilitating economic liability."" This exposure, coupled
with the unsettled state of the law will have a "chilling effect" on
the trend toward creative utilization of land use controls.'" In the
absence of clarification, the great strides which have been made in
ecological preservation and zoning regulation will be impaired,
'" See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussion of "nexus" test).
186 First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. The dissent criticized the majority for addressing an
issue which was not presented and then concluded that the majority had "answered that
self-imposed question in a superficial and ...dangerous way." Id. at 2390 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
's See id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 627 (1981) (appellant received over three million dollars for a tempo-
rary taking). See also Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land
Use Law?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1597-98 (1977) ("severe and unexpected financial liabil-
ity" will result from such a rule); Note, supra note 118, at 567 (adverse effects on municipal
budget); Morris, Supreme Court Land Use Decisions Uncertain in Defining a "Taking," Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 7, 1987, at 20, col. 4 n.10 (executive director of National League of Cities
claimed ruling "exposed local governments to a torrent of costly lawsuits"). But see Kass &
Gerrard, Excessive Sound, Fury Over Land-Use Ruling, N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1987, at 1, col. 1
(holding is narrowly limited to total deprivation of property, therefore it is not widely
applicable).
18 See Merrill, Takings Clause Re-Emerges, But No Clear Pattern Seen, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 17,
1987, at S-8, col. 3. "[I]f the rules for finding a regulatory taking are completely unpredict-
able, the ... [First English decision] could have a serious 'chilling effect' on desirable"
regulation. Id. See also Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, supra note 118, at
240. The writers forewarned that if Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas became the
majority view, municipalities would not adopt regulations which are necessary to plan their
growth. Id.
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and as Justice Stevens foretold, the floodgates to unproductive
and unnecessary litigation will be opened."'
Christopher P. Belisle & Mary Ann Hallenborg
In First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "One thing is certain.
The Court's decision today will generate a lot of litigation . .. most of it . . . unproduc-
tive." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
